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The contrast between self- and other-produced tickles, as a special case of sensory
attenuation for self-produced actions, has long been a target of empirical research. While
in standard wake states it is nearly impossible to tickle oneself, there are interesting
exceptions. Notably, participants awakened from REM (rapid eye movement-) sleep
dreams are able to tickle themselves. So far, however, the question of whether it is
possible to tickle oneself and be tickled by another in the dream state has not been
investigated empirically or addressed from a theoretical perspective. Here, we report
the results of an explorative web-based study in which participants were asked to rate
their sensations during self-tickling and being tickled during wakefulness, imagination,
and lucid dreaming. Our results, though highly preliminary, indicate that in the special
case of lucid control dreams, the difference between self-tickling and being tickled by
another is obliterated, with both self- and other produced tickles receiving similar ratings
as self-tickling during wakefulness. This leads us to the speculative conclusion that in lucid
control dreams, sensory attenuation for self-produced tickles spreads to those produced
by non-self dream characters. These preliminary results provide the backdrop for a more
general theoretical and metatheoretical discussion of tickling in lucid dreams in a predictive
processing framework. We argue that the primary value of our study lies not so much
in our results, which are subject to important limitations, but rather in the fact that they
enable a new theoretical perspective on the relationship between sensory attenuation, the
self-other distinction and agency, as well as suggest new questions for future research.
In particular, the example of tickling during lucid dreaming raises the question of whether
sensory attenuation and the self-other distinction can be simulated largely independently
of external sensory input.
Keywords: agency, self-other distinction, dreaming, lucidity, tickling, self-tickling, sensory attenuation, predictive
processing
“ . . . from the fact that a child can hardly tickle itself, or in a much
less degree than when tickled by another person, it seems the precise
point to be touched must not be known. . .”
(Darwin, 1859)
INTRODUCTION
Why is it almost impossible to tickle oneself, and so easy to be
tickled by others? And what can tickling tell us about the sense of
agency, ownership and the self-other distinction? At least since
Darwin, it has been thought that the inability to self-tickle—
especially to the point of inducing laughter—is linked to the
unpredictability and uncontrollability of other- as opposed to
self-tickling. The advent of tickling machines enabled researchers
to identify and isolate the relevant factors in an experimen-
tally controlled manner. In a seminal study, Weiskrantz et al.
(1971) devised an apparatus that could be used for active (motor
command plus proprioceptive feedback) or passive (propriocep-
tive feedback without motor commands) self-tickling as well for
being tickled by another person. They found that active self-
tickling was least effective, with passive self-tickling being inter-
mediate between active self-tickling and being tickled by another.
This result, which has been confirmed in a number of follow-
up studies (e.g., Blakemore et al., 2000b), suggests that sensory
feed-forward information, but also proprioceptive feedback from
the tickling hand are crucial for sensory attenuation during self-
tickling and for the self-other distinction. The general idea is
that sensory attenuation, in which the sensory consequences of
self-generated actions are dampened, underlies the ability to dis-
tinguish between self and others (Blakemore et al., 2000a; Frith
et al., 2000). Because the sensory consequences of self-produced
tickling match our predictions and thus are unsurprising, they
also feel less ticklish than the more unexpected tickles produced
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 717 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Windt et al. Self-tickling and attenuation in dreams
by others. Indeed, on this view, the felt ticklishness of other-
produced tickles alerts us to the fact that we have been tickled
by another, and not by ourselves.
TICKLING IN A PREDICTIVE PROCESSING FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework proposed by predictive processing
accounts now offers a new perspective on Darwin’s claim that sen-
sory attenuation during self-tickling depends on the predictability
of the stimulus. According to this framework (e.g., Clark, 2013b;
Hohwy, 2013), the brain is essentially involved in hypothesis test-
ing and prediction error minimization, with prediction errors
resulting from a mismatch between predicted and actual sensory
input. While prediction error minimization has been suggested to
operate on many different levels of the cortical hierarchy and to
underlie a wide range of cognitive processes, including percep-
tion, beliefs, learning and attention to illusions, hallucinations
and delusions (Mumford, 1992; Hohwy, 2010), there are prin-
cipally two different ways in which it can be achieved. First,
incoming sensory inputs can be used to optimize internal pre-
dictions (or generative models) about the brain’s next possible
states, as in perception. Second, action, or active inference, ensues
when the organism changes its sensory inputs in order to bet-
ter match its predictions (Friston et al., 2011). What the brain
abhors, on this account, is surprise: the amount of surprise, or
more technically free energy (Friston and Kiebel, 2009), signals
that the internal predictions were insufficiently accurate or out-
right false. Less surprise, on this view, indicates a better fit of the
internal models.
This view offers a new way of making sense of sensory atten-
uation during self-tickling. On the classical model, a copy (the
so-called efference copy) of motor commands is used to compare
the predicted and actual sensory consequences of self-generated
movement; when the discrepancy is minimal, sensory attenua-
tion occurs (Blakemore et al., 1998a,b, 2003; Frith et al., 2000).
By contrast, predictive processing accounts do away with the
need for an efference copy, suggesting that in ambiguous situa-
tions, the attribution of agency can be resolved by attending away
from the consequences of self-generated movements. On this
view, “sensory attenuation is a necessary consequence of reducing
the precision of sensory evidence during movement to allow the
expression of proprioceptive predictions that incite movement”
(Brown et al., 2013, p. 413). Attenuation, in other words, is the
phenomenal mark of self- as opposed to other-generated action.
A recent study (van Doorn et al., 2014) contrasted these
two accounts by investigating self-tickling and being tickled by
another person in a highly surprising context—namely an exper-
imentally induced self-other confusion involving the illusion
of having swapped bodies with someone else (cf. Petkova and
Ehrsson, 2008) and of experiencing another person’s hand as
one’s own (cf. rubber hand illusion; Botvinick and Cohen, 1998).
The background idea was that this would be a way of testing
whether confrontation with a highly non-standard, surprising
situation might undermine the precision with which the exact
pattern of proprioceptive and tactile feedback during self-tickling
could be predicted—thus enabling it to feel more like being tick-
led by someone else. Whereas this would fit the classical efference
copy model, van Doorn and colleagues’ findings suggest that this
is not the case: “even as participants shift their first-person per-
spective to someone else’s, or experience having a baseball bat
as a hand, or an invisible hand, there is no change in the char-
acteristic pattern of feeling less tickle sensation when producing
the touch themselves, and more tickle sensation when the touch
is produced by someone else” (van Doorn et al., 2014, p. 8).
The authors conclude that because sensory attenuation during
self-tickling remains robust even in these highly surprising condi-
tions, active inference, rather than context, is crucial for sensory
attenuation, thus favoring predictive processing over the classical
efference copy model.
THE PHENOMENAL-FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DREAMING
In the following, we argue that dreams are a unique contrast con-
dition for investigating the relationship between agency and the
self-other distinction not just in specific experimental setups in
waking participants, but across the sleep-wake cycle. In particu-
lar, the example of dreaming can extend existing work on sensory
attenuation and the self-other distinction within the framework
of predictive processing.
First, while paradigms investigating full-body illusions such as
the body-swap illusion aim to disturb themechanisms underlying
the self-other distinction in healthy, waking subjects, dreaming
involves a more profound and naturally occurring breakdown
of the distinction between self and non-self, or between inter-
nally and externally generated sensory information. In the dream
state, what is in fact an internally generated world-model—the
dream world—is not experienced as self-generated, but simply as
real (Metzinger, 2003; Revonsuo, 2006), typically including the
experience of interacting with mind-independent characters and
objects. Dreams are, in other words, immersive spatiotemporal hal-
lucinations (Windt, 2010, 2015): they involve the robust sense of
presence in a world that is experienced as real; yet, at the same
time, this experienced world is only weakly constrained by sen-
sory inputs from the sleeping subject’s actual environment and is
largely the product of internal signal generation, and hence hal-
lucinatory. Because of this profound confusion of internally and
externally produced stimuli, dreaming has even been suggested to
be a model of delusional and hallucinatory wake states, such as
those arising in schizophrenia (see Hobson, 1999; Gottesmann,
2006; see Windt and Noreika, 2011, for critical discussion).
Second and relatedly, social imagery is abundant in dreams,
with non-self (usually human) dream characters being described
in over 95% of adults’ dream reports and the average dream
involving 2–4 non-self dream characters (Kahn et al., 2000; see
Nielsen and Lara-Carrasco, 2007, for details and further refer-
ences). These are typically experienced as being highly realistic
and clearly distinct from the self. Social interactions are actu-
ally even more frequent in dream reports than in randomly
timed waking reports (McNamara et al., 2005) and are often
experienced as emotionally engaging (Kahn et al., 2002). In par-
ticular, non-self dream characters are often experienced as having
a mind of their own, with dream reports frequently describing
cases in which the dreamer engages in theory-of-mind attribu-
tions by ascribing emotions, beliefs and desires to other dream
characters (McNamara et al., 2007). This suggests that dream-
ing involves not only a breakdown of the distinction between
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internally and externally generated sensory information, but also
specific disturbances in self-other distinctions.
Third, while both dreaming and wakefulness are characterized,
on the phenomenological level of description, by the experience
of interacting with a world, the transition from wakefulness
to dreaming is accompanied by important functional changes.
During the dream state, conscious experience is comparatively
shielded from and only weakly constrained by external stimuli.
While external stimuli are occasionally incorporated in dreams,
the pattern of incorporation is often indirect, resembling sen-
sory illusions rather than veridical perception (as in a dream
of hearing a siren that is triggered by the sound of one’s alarm
clock; cf. Nielsen et al., 1995; see Windt, 2015, for theoretical dis-
cussion). Moreover, REM-sleep paralysis, or the near-complete
absence of muscle tone during REM sleep, prevents the outward
enactment of internally experienced movements (for a discussion
of important exceptions involving dream-enactment behavior,
see Schenck, 2005; Nielsen et al., 2009; Leclair-Visonneau et al.,
2010). This unique phenomenal-functional configuration, as will
become clear below, is particularly interesting from a predictive
processing perspective.
PREDICTIVE PROCESSES IN DREAMS
Recent attempts to accommodate REM-sleep dreaming in a pre-
dictive processing framework suggest that alterations in the mon-
itoring and generation of sensory predictions might be crucial
to dreaming. As noted above, these accounts owe some of their
attraction to the ambitious claim that not just veridical percep-
tion, but also imagination, hallucinations and nocturnal dreams
are the outcome of a process of hypothesis testing and pre-
diction error minimization. In this framework, dreaming, due
to the comparative attenuation of external stimulus processing,
has been described as a state in which hypothesis testing and
prediction error minimization can be rehearsed and optimized
(Clark, 2013a,b; Hohwy, 2013; cf. Hobson and Friston, 2012,
2014).
For the same reason, however, dreaming also presents a chal-
lenge for predictive processing accounts. Recall that the key claim
of these accounts is that internal predictions are tested against
incoming sensory stimuli, resulting either in the optimization of
the internal, generative models themselves (as in perception) or
in changing the incoming stimuli to better fit the internal mod-
els (as in active inference). In dreams, however, both types of
processes are disturbed: because dreams unfold largely indepen-
dently of sensory input and motor output, the crucial ingredient
for either model optimization or active inference is lacking. Yet,
because dreaming nonetheless involves the vivid phenomenol-
ogy of perceiving and interacting with a mind-independent world
rather than with one of our own making, both processes must be
simulated, as it were, largely offline. Indeed, it has been suggested
that dream bizarreness might result from the fact that dreams are
largely unconstrained by external stimuli and hence by predic-
tion errors, leading to the loss of representational accuracy, for
instance of visual dream imagery (cf. Fletcher and Frith, 2009;
Hobson and Friston, 2012). This does not explain, however, why
large portions of dream experience are not bizarre, but are expe-
rienced as highly realistic (including, as noted above, non-self
dream characters). This in itself is a remarkable computational
achievement, suggesting that in the special case of dreaming, the
processes of prediction error minimization and hypothesis test-
ing are simulated largely internally, but nonetheless in a fairly
realistic manner. Dreams thus offer a unique opportunity for
investigating the interplay between hypothesis testing and predic-
tion error minimization on the one hand and the sensory stimuli
they are tested against, in standard wake states, on the other hand,
suggesting that this relationship changes dramatically over the
sleep-wake cycle.
SELF TICKLING IN DREAMS?
In sum, the presented literature suggests that a transient break-
down in the ability to discriminate, on the level of phenomenal
experience, between self- and other-generated actions, mediated
by disturbances in the sense of agency and the precision of sen-
sory predictions, might be crucial to the unique phenomenology
of dreaming. Here, we suggest that questions about the pro-
cess of hypothesis testing and prediction error minimization in
dreams can be sharpened by focusing on the special question of
why, in dreams, self-produced actions are experienced as if they
were caused by others. Again, sensory attenuation for self-tickling
as opposed to being tickled by another is a promising exam-
ple. In particular, schizophrenics, unlike healthy participants, are
able to tickle themselves (Blakemore et al., 2000a,b), presum-
ably due to a disturbance in self-other distinctions. Similarly,
Blagrove et al. (2006) found that participants awakened from
REM sleep dreams are able to tickle themselves, which they
explained by saying that “a deficit in self-monitoring and a con-
fusion between self- and external-stimulation accompany REM
dream formation” (Blagrove et al., 2006, p. 291).
The logical next question to ask, we suggest, is whether it is
possible to tickle oneself in dreams. Here, it is important to note
that the evidence presented by Blagrove and colleagues is indi-
rect at best, as the effect was only observed after awakening and
not during the dream state itself. Moreover, participants were only
asked about the presence or absence of dream recall, but the con-
tent of their dreams was not analyzed. This points to an important
methodological limitation, namely the practical impossibility of
obtaining systematic ticklishness ratings for self- as compared to
other-administered tickles during dreams. Lucid dreams, how-
ever, are an important exception, as they involve not only insight
into the fact that one is now dreaming, but often also the ability
to control the dream narrative, including the actions of non-self
dream characters (LaBerge, 1985, 1990; Voss et al., 2013). Lucid
insight into the fact that one is dreaming often coexists along-
side vivid visual and motor hallucinations and social imagery,
sometimes even leading lucid dreamers to think they are shar-
ing their dream with another (Levitan, 1994). This is important,
because it suggests that the disturbances in self-other distinctions
that characterize nonlucid dreams largely remain intact in lucid
dreams.
Our study aimed to exploit this fact by asking participants
to contrast self- and other-administered tickles in three condi-
tions: wakefulness, imagination, and lucid dreaming. Based on
theoretical considerations on lucid dreams, but also on find-
ings on self-tickling in healthy participants, schizophrenics, and
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following REM-sleep dreams, we predicted that while our par-
ticipants would rate other-administered tickles as more ticklish
than self-administered ones in wakefulness (prediction 1), this
difference would be diminished in dreams (prediction 2). We
also expected that in dreams, self-tickling would feel more like
being tickled by another than like self-tickling in wakefulness
(prediction 3). By contrast, we expected the distinction between
self- and other-administered tickles to be preserved for imagined
tickles (prediction 4), though we expected that both would be
rated as less ticklish than their actual (and dreamed) counterparts
(prediction 5).
AN EXPLORATIVE STUDY OF SELF-TICKLING IN LUCID
DREAMS
This explorative online study aimed to rate how ticklish it feels
to tickle oneself as compared to being tickled by someone else in
three different conditions: actual self-tickling vs. actually being
tickled during wakefulness; imagined self-tickling vs. imagining
being tickled; and self-tickling vs. being tickled by another in a
lucid dream.
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were recruited via a German Internet platform for
lucid dreamers (www.klartraum.de). Sixty-one persons partici-
pated in the first part of the study (questionnaire on actual and
imagined tickling in wakefulness), but only 9 participated in the
second part (tickling in lucid dreams). From our data we cannot
judge whether this high drop-out rate was due to the difficulty
of the task or the time-consuming nature of the study as whole.
We did, however, ask participants to fill out the lucid dreaming
questionnaire even if they did not manage to tickle themselves in
their dream. Out of the 9 dream responses, 7 (4 female, average
age 20.7) were able to complete the task and were thus included
in the analysis.
PROCEDURE
The experiment was entirely web-based. Written instructions
were given to the participants before they started the experi-
ment. Participants were instructed to complete the experiment
in two sessions. Actual tickling and imagined tickling were per-
formed in a first session during the daytime, followed by dream
tickling in a second session during a lucid dream. In all condi-
tions, participants were asked to use (or imagine using, respec-
tively) a feather, brush or a similar tool to first tickle their own
foot, then to ask (or imagine asking) someone else to tickle
their foot. Immediately after each task (respectively after wak-
ing up from a lucid dream), they completed an online ques-
tionnaire, adapted from the study conducted by Blagrove et al.
(2006), in which they were asked to rate how “intense,” “tick-
lish,” “pleasant,” and “irritating” the stimulation felt on a dis-
crete scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). For the dream
condition, they were additionally asked to give a free dream
report (see supplementary material). In order to minimize the
risk of forgetting, we emphasized the importance of filling in
the questionnaire and reporting their dream immediately after
awakening.
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FIGURE 1 | Meanandstandarderror of theparticipants’ ratings for eachof the four scales in the threedifferent conditions (waking, imagining, dreaming).
∗Indicates p < 0.05 according to an uncorrected, non-parametric comparison between ratings for self-tickling and ratings for being tickled by another person.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 717 | 4
Windt et al. Self-tickling and attenuation in dreams
Table 1 | Results of the Wilcoxon comparisons.
Scale State Mean other Mean self Z-score p-value
Intense Waking 7.3 4.4 2.06 0.04
Imagining 6.0 3.1 1.90 0.06
Dreaming 5.3 3.4 1.46 0.14
Ticklish Waking 8.3 4.3 2.02 0.04
Imagining 6.3 3.2 2.00 0.046
Dreaming 5.6 4.6 1.29 0.20
Pleasant Waking 4.6 4.7 0.41 0.68
Imagine 6.2 2.3 2.20 0.03
Dreaming 5.3 3.0 1.60 0.11
Irritating Waking 3.3 2.1 1.84 0.07
Imagining 2.6 2.0 0.45 0.66
Dreaming 1.7 1.4 1.41 0.16
Red color = significant value (p < 0.05).
RESULTS
The results are depicted in Figure 1, which shows mean and
standard errors for each of the four scales in the three dif-
ferent conditions (waking, imagining, dreaming). Uncorrected
wilcoxon tests (see Table 1) were done for each scale in each of the
conditions in order to test whether there was a difference between
self-tickling and being tickled by another person.
Confirming previous findings (e.g., Weiskrantz et al., 1971)
and in line with prediction 1, participants’ ratings of the tick-
lishness of other-administered tickles were higher than for self-
tickling when the task was performed during wakefulness. A
similar pattern was found for imagined self- and other-admini-
stered tickling, though both had a lesser absolute intensity
than actual tickling (thus confirming predictions 4 and 5). This
makes us confident that participants performed the test cor-
rectly and that the method was sufficient to replicate the results
found by a number of existing studies. By contrast, during
lucid dreams, and in line with prediction 2, we found no sig-
nificant difference between self- and other-administered tick-
ling. Interestingly, however, ticklish sensations in dreams still
felt less ticklish than actually being tickled by another person
during wakefulness and were comparable to waking self-tickling
(Wilcoxon test, Z = 0.82, p = 0.41)—thus contradicting predic-
tion 3. This effect was specific to ticklishness ratings, and dream
tickles were rated as similarly intense, irritating and pleasant as
imagined and/or actual tickles. Our highly preliminary conclu-
sion is that both being tickled and tickling oneself, at least in
a lucid dream, feel much like tickling oneself in wakefulness,
but weaker than being tickled by another. This, in turn, sug-
gests that in the special case of lucid control dreams, sensory
attenuation characterizes not just self-administered tickles, but
also those experienced as being administered by another. This
stands in interesting contrast to the findings that schizophrenic
participants rate self-tickling as being as intense as being tick-
led by another, and that the same is true for participants
who have awakened from (presumably nonlucid) REM-sleep
dreams.
LIMITATIONS
Clearly, this study is subject to important limitations and the
results should be taken with caution. Yet, we think that con-
sidering these in detail is interesting in itself, because it helps
illustrate what we take to be the larger theoretical implications
of this study. Though this may sound somewhat paradoxical, we
think that the value of our study lies, in part, in the insights that
can be derived from a careful consideration of what it did not
show, and why. Indeed, this is also why we take the main value
of this study to be of a theoretical rather than of an empirical
nature. In particular, a discussion of these limitations also sug-
gests a number of specific challenges and questions for future
research.
PRACTICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS
To begin with, there are a number of practical and methodolog-
ical limitations. Due to the demanding nature of the task, only a
very small number of participants succeeded in completing the
tickle-test in a lucid dream. Because this was an online study, we
could not control whether the task was indeed carried out accord-
ing to our instructions (though reports no. 4 and 5 suggest that
this was the case), which sleep stage the lucid dreams occurred in,
or how soon after awakening participants actually reported their
dreams. This situation could be improved by conducting a labora-
tory study, insisting on signal verified lucid dreams and obtaining
polysomnographic measurements to determine the sleep stages in
which the dreams occurred (cf. LaBerge et al., 1981).
Furthermore, unlike the studies of self-tickling in waking par-
ticipants, we were not able to use a tickling machine and thus
to standardize the procedure. Rather, as shown by the dream
reports, our participants dreamt up different tickling devices,
such as wooden spoons, pens, or branches (cf. reports no. 1, 4,
6) and were also occasionally tickled elsewhere than on the foot
(cf. reports no. 5, 8). A number of dream reports describe difficul-
ties with dream-character compliance, such that dream characters
refused to carry out the tickling task or poked rather than tickled
the dream self (cf. report no. 1). Some dream reports are also too
short to be sure whether dreamers were really lucid (cf. reports
no. 3, 7, 8), and even when lucid, participants occasionally forgot
to carry out the task (cf. report no. 9).
Expectation may have also biased our results. For instance,
Giguère and LaBerge (1995) found that pinching in a lucid dream
was not really painful, possibly due to expectation and motiva-
tion bias; moreover, at least one dream report (cf. report no. 2)
suggests that the dreamer was theorizing about the outcome and
implications of the experiment even during the lucid dream. Yet,
the fact that ticklish-ratings for lucid dreams did not simply mir-
ror ratings for actual and imagined tickling and specifically that
the characteristic gap between self- and other administered tickles
was preserved during imagined, but obliterated during dreamed
task performance suggests that our study nonetheless tapped into
a genuine difference.
THEORETICAL LIMITATIONS
A further limitation that is not specific to our study but charac-
terizes lucid dream research in general is that the generalizability
of results from lucid to nonlucid dreams is unclear. Indeed, it is
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 717 | 5
Windt et al. Self-tickling and attenuation in dreams
possible that prediction 3, which was contradicted by our study,
accurately characterizes nonlucid dreams. Because the phenom-
enal property of agency and the resulting ability to control both
one’s own and others’ actions differ strongly between lucid and
nonlucid dreams (Metzinger, 2003; Windt and Metzinger, 2007;
Voss et al., 2013), and because of the suggested link between
agency and sensory attenuation, it could well be that in nonlucid
dreams, there would be no sensory attenuation for self-tickling.
A first step toward answering this question might be to com-
pare ticklish sensations after waking up from lucid as compared
to non-lucid dreams. If the attenuation of ticklish sensations in
lucid dreams is indeed related to the increased sense of agency that
characterizes lucid dream control, then one might expect both
self- and other-administered tickles to be attenuated even after
awakening from a lucid dream. Alternatively, the pattern observed
in dreamsmight also be reversed, and participants awakened from
a lucid dream might show the same ticklish ratings as partic-
ipants awakened from nonlucid REM-sleep dreams, namely an
increased ability to tickle themselves. It could also be the case,
however, that after awakening from a lucid dream, ticklish ratings
are the same as in standard wakefulness, but different from the
pattern observed following nonlucid REM-sleep dreams. Indeed,
lucid dreams are often described as involving a shift toward wake-
like cognitive activity and agentive control and might even be
regarded as subjective states in a much stronger sense than non-
lucid dreams (Metzinger, 2003; Windt and Metzinger, 2007).
It has also been suggested that lucidity occurs during a hybrid
state between nonlucid REM-sleep dreams and wakefulness (Voss
et al., 2009). Whatever the outcome, contrasting ticklishness rat-
ings after awakening from lucid and nonlucid dreams might tell
us something about the relationship between lucid insight, agency
and sensory attenuation, as well as about the generalizability of
our results from lucid to nonlucid dreams.
DISCUSSION
Given the limitations discussed above, the results of our study are
highly preliminary. Yet, we think they give rise to a number of
interesting, albeit speculative, considerations, as well as to some
new hypotheses and perspectives for future research. In order to
describe these in amaximally clear manner, we will assume, purely
for the sake of argument, that our results had been substantiated
by further studies. Skeptical readers are invited to regard the fol-
lowing as a theory-based thought experiment loosely inspired by
some preliminary empirical observations.
DOES SENSORY ATTENUATION REALLY UNDERLIE THE SELF-OTHER
DISTINCTION IN DREAMS?
Even if they are taken at face value, it is important to note that the
interpretation of our results is hampered by an underlying theo-
retical ambiguity. Spelling this out in some detail is instructive,
because it helps illustrate a more general difficulty in compar-
ing dreams and wakefulness. This is especially important given
our claim that the example of lucid dreaming extends research on
sensory attenuation in wakefulness. So far we have assumed that
the weak ticklishness ratings found in our study are indeed an
example of sensory attenuation specific to self-generated actions.
However, because dream actions unfold largely independently
both of the actual execution of dream movements (with the
exception of dream-enactment) and of appropriate propriocep-
tive feedback, it is not clear that it makes sense to say that in
dreams, the consequences of self-produced actions are attenu-
ated in the first place. Moreover, while dreams typically involve
the experience of phenomenal selfhood, or of being or having a
self, bodily experiences are characteristically underrepresented in
dreams, and body and body-part representations can also differ
from the waking body (cf. report no. 4, which describes that the
dreamer’s toe looked like a banana, as well as difficulty control-
ling leg movements; for details and further references, see Windt,
2010, 2015). Consequently, it is possible that the attenuation of
ticklish sensations observed in our study is an artifact of the more
general phenomenal-functional characteristics of bodily experi-
ence in the dream state. On this view, sensory attenuation would
only be present for the sensory consequences of actual move-
ments and would not be applicable to the case of dreamed actions
unfolding independently of their outward counterparts.
We do not, however, think that this alternative explanation,
in itself, offers an entirely satisfying account of our findings.
To begin with, studies of lucid dreaming suggest that dream
movements continue to be associated with muscle twitches in
the respective limbs (LaBerge et al., 1981; Fenwick et al., 1984)
as well as with activation of the sensorimotor cortex (Erlacher
and Schredl, 2008; Dresler et al., 2011). Moreover, while touch,
thermal and pain sensations are only rarely described in dream
reports (Hobson, 1988), both lucid and nonlucid dreams do at
least occasionally include vivid tactile or even pain sensations
(e.g., Voss et al., 2011). This was also the case in at least some
of the dreams reported by our participants, who described either
varying degrees of ticklishness or other sensations such as pain (cf.
reports no. 1, 4, 5, 6). Also, a questionnaire-based study similar to
our own found that dream caressing was rated as having equal
intensity as actual (but not as imagined) caressing (Giguère and
LaBerge, 1995). It at least seems possible, then, that our results can
be compared to sensory attenuation of the type that is otherwise
specific to the sensory consequences of self-generated actions in
wakefulness.
A recent review of the factors underlying sensory attenuation
further supports the claim that sensory attenuation is not wholly
determined by motor predictions. As Hughes et al. (2013) sug-
gest, the ability to predict or even control the timing of sensory
events may also modulate sensory attenuation. As most existing
studies have not controlled for these factors, it is unclear, accord-
ing to the authors, that sensory attenuation, for instance during
self-tickling, is driven by motor rather than temporal predictions
or temporal control. They also tentatively suggest that temporal
predictions may play a role in explaining schizophrenics’ halluci-
nations and delusions of control. This leads us to speculate that a
similar factor might be driving our results in lucid dreams.
A first conclusion, then, would be that lucid control dreams are
the special case in which sensory attenuation spreads to actions
initiated by “others,” at least in the sense in which non-self dream
characters are experienced as distinct from the self, thus dampen-
ing other-generated tickles to a level comparable to self-generated
ones. It is noteworthy that in dreams, this is not, however, asso-
ciated with a complete obliteration of the experienced self-other
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distinction. By contrast, in wakefulness, illusory feelings of agency,
or the experience of being able to control another’s actions (e.g.,
vicarious agencyWegner et al., 2004) typically also result in an illu-
sory feeling of ownership for these actions and in disturbed self-
other distinctions (Tsakiris et al., 2006). For fully lucid dreams,
the situation seems to be different: even though in such dreams,
dreamers know that they are dreaming and are aware that non-self
dream characters (including their actions) are ultimately crea-
tures of their own making, they still continue to experience these
as clearly distinct from themselves (see also our dream reports).
Contrary to what one might expect based on studies of vicarious
agency and full-body illusions in wakefulness, in dreams, control-
ling a body does not, it would seem, induce one to experience this
body as one’s own.
A fascinating question that we at present have no answer for is
how to explain this difference. In order to be able even to ges-
ture toward an explanation, one would have to know whether
agency and/or sensory attenuation for dream tickles is prior to
self-other distinction of the type involved, for instance, in expe-
riencing another dream character as distinct from oneself (i.e.,
the dream self), whether the opposite is true, or whether these
processes are independent. Whereas in wakefulness, ownership
seems, at least occasionally, to follow on the heels of agency (such
as inmotor versions of the rubber-hand illusion; see Tsakiris et al.,
2006), it is also possible that the purely phenomenological dis-
tinction between dream self and non-self dream characters taps
into more basic and robust processes.
SENSORY ATTENUATION AND SELF-OTHER DISTINCTIONS IN DREAMS
FROM A PREDICTIVE PROCESSING PERSPECTIVE
The problem of how to describe the relationship between sensory
attenuation and self-other distinctions in dreams can be nicely
sharpened by describing it from the perspective of predictive pro-
cessing. Recall that predictive processing accounts suggest that
in dreaming as in waking, we only have access to our genera-
tive models, but are never in direct perceptual contact with the
world. Hence, the direct comparison between these states within
a predictive processing framework seems permissible—with the
exception, noted above, that in dreams, the predictions are not
kept in check by the outer world, thus being able to “roam free.”
Conscious experience in dreams, then, may be seen as isolating
our prior convictions from the ability to test them against incom-
ing sensory input. On this view, dreaming is even more strongly
constrained by our prior convictions about the world because we
lack the means to check and adjust them to sensory input during
perception and active inference.
Moreover, recent attempts to account for self-consciousness
in a predictive processing framework highlight the probabilis-
tic nature of self-representation, including the representation of
one’s physical body (Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Apps
and Tsakiris, 2014). What is experienced as the self is, on this
view, highly plastic and constrained not only by low-level influ-
ences, such as multisensory stimuli and even interoceptive cues
(on the latter, see Seth et al., 2012; Aspell et al., 2013; van Elk
et al., 2014), but also by high-level processes such as long-term
beliefs. In particular, as Apps and Tsakiris (2014, p. 92) put it, “the
free-energy account argues that information prior to an event
will nuance predictions about the likely sensory input, and when
sensory input is received, the prior information biases the prob-
abilistic inferences that are made causes of an event.” Self-other
distinctions in dreams, on this view, reflect sensory predictions
operating under non-standard conditions of highly unstable and
mostly internally generated sensory information and driven to a
considerable extent by long-standing and shorter-term contextual
beliefs.
What, then, are the priors driving the experience of self-
tickling and being tickled by another in dreams? One of these,
it would seem, is the conviction that we cannot fully control, or at
least not directly and via acts of will, any bodily agent other than
ourselves. Indeed, given that participants were asked to control
the actions of dream characters they were already experiencing as
distinct from the self, this might explain why the task investigated
in our study was so difficult to complete in a lucid dream—and
perhaps even the low response rate and the varying success of our
participants. Perhaps, the type of control exerted over non-self
dream characters in lucid dreams is sufficient to induce sensory
attenuation for ticklish sensations, but not to obliterate the expe-
rience that other dream characters are distinct from oneself—and
perhaps, the very nature of the task prevented our participants
from developing this stronger form of control in the first place.
This is also borne out by the fact that lucid dream control is often
incomplete or has unintended results (Stumbrys et al., 2012). Yet,
another interpretation is also possible. In particular, a strong con-
viction driving these effects in lucid dreams might be that to
the extent that one is able to control an agent, this agent can-
not be fully distinct from oneself. This would plausibly lead the
sensory results of movements generated by these agents—such
as tickling—to be experienced similarly to instances of tickling
oneself. As Apps and Tsakiris (2014) note, the mere expectation
or predictability of a self-stimulus might be sufficient to lead to
sensory attenuation. As being tickled by another in a lucid con-
trol dream is predictable, this might account for the spread of
sensory attenuation to tickles generated by non-self dream char-
acters. This also fits in well with the finding that authorship beliefs
about the causes of sensory changes in the environment may be
one of the factors underlying sensory attenuation (Desantis et al.,
2012).
But yet another and perhaps even more basic prior is needed
to explain why the self-other distinction is not obliterated com-
pletely in lucid control dreams. This is that at any given moment,
there should not only be a self, but also no more than a single self.
Indeed, dreams exacerbate the computational problem of deter-
mining which one among a number of different body models
is the unit of identification (Metzinger, 2013) and hence expe-
rienced as the self. Recall that dreams are not only rich with social
imagery, but also that input from the physical body, typically a
primary source of information for self-representation (Apps and
Tsakiris, 2014), is only intermittently available. Yet, it is telling that
even in lucid control dreams, where multiple (visual) body mod-
els are simultaneously active and under one’s own control, only
one of these is typically experienced as being the self, whereas
the others are experienced as distinct from the self. This fits in
well with the finding that in wakefulness, instances of bi-location
and of identification with more than one body-model at the same
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time are rare and typically unstable (as in heautoscopy; see Blanke
and Mohr, 2005; see also Furlanetto et al., 2013). Research is only
beginning to investigate the feeling of disowning one’s own body
in full-body illusions, and again, there is some indication that the
experience of owning a different body comes at the price of dis-
owning one’s own (Guterstam and Ehrsson, 2012). Taken together
with our evidence from lucid control dreams, this suggests that
at its most basic, the self-other distinction is driven neither by
agency nor by multisensory integration, but by the assumption
that there is always exactly one unit of identification, the self.
Dreams thus might be a good research model for investigating
the simplest form of phenomenal selfhood (cf. Windt, 2010, 2015;
Metzinger, 2013) as well as the most basic forms of modeling
and understanding others (for a discussion of the applicability
of predictive processing to social cognition, see Limanowski and
Blankenburg, 2013).
In addition, note that in lucid dreams, there is also an interplay
of long-standing and probably largely unconscious expectations
of the type described above, and short-term, unconscious and
conscious expectations about the specific situation encountered
in the dream (for the effect of unconscious priming on sen-
sory attenuation, see Gentsch and Schütz-Bosbach, 2011). Lucid
dream control is a learnable skill (Stumbrys et al., 2012), and
the complexity of the tickling task investigated in our study leads
us to expect that our participants were likely experienced lucid
dreamers, equipped with specific expectations about lucid dreams
in general and non-self dream characters in particular. Indeed,
as suggested by report no. 2, at least one participant was con-
sidering the theoretical implications of the dream experiment
even while dreaming. At the very least, our participants, to the
extent that they were indeed lucid, knew that they were dream-
ing and that they were controlling non-self dream characters that
were not in fact real. They also may have had specific back-
ground beliefs about the autonomy of other dream characters,
their own ability to control them, etc. Hence, it is quite possible
that these lucid-dream-specific convictions colored our results as
well. Indeed, dream report no. 4 describes that when the dreamer
was unexpectedly tickled by another dream character, this felt
more ticklish than willing the non-self dream character to per-
form the tickle-test. Expectations may have also been driving the
dreamer’s discovery, in the same dream report, that, following an
initially weak tickling sensation, he or she had a Band-Aid on the
foot—almost as if the process of dream imagery production were
automatically explaining away the unexpected weakness of the
sensation. Seen from a predictive processing perspective, it thus
seems possible that the role of expectation in lucid dreams was not
so much, as indicated above, a limitation as a factor contributing
to sensory attenuation for self- and other-administered tickles.
While it seems difficult or even near-impossible, for practical
reasons, to tease these different factors apart in future studies of
lucid dreaming, the way forward, we suggest, might be to create an
experimental setup that could be performed with waking partic-
ipants, but that would nonetheless mimic the situation involved
in lucid control dreams as closely as possible. We suggest that this
might be a fruitful way of evaluating the different explanations
briefly sketched above and thus of extending existing research on
sensory attenuation during self-tickling.
THE WAY FORWARD? TOWARD A NEW EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
The question, then, is whether a similar effect, involving sensory
attenuation for other-administered tickling, whilst leaving the
phenomenological distinction between self and non-self intact,
might exist in standard wake states as well. To begin with, note
that in a sense, our explorative study can be regarded as themirror
image of the study conducted by van Doorn et al. (2014). While
they asked whether swapping bodies with another enables one to
tickle oneself, our study investigated not only whether one can
tickle oneself in a dream, but also, at least implicitly, whether one
can tickle oneself by controlling, indirectly and via thought, the
movements of a non-self dream character. The waking analog to
this situation in lucid dreams would be to create a virtual reality
(VR) setup in which participants can be tickled by avatars that are
under their voluntary control for an extended period of time, but
without simultaneously identifying with them or experiencing
ownership for their bodies and bodily actions.
How might this be done? Standard VR setups and full-body
and body-part illusions rely heavily on multisensory and senso-
rimotor coherence (for a review, see Bohil et al., 2011). Here,
e.g., synchronous visuotactile stimulation leads participants to
experience a virtual body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007) or body
part (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) as their own. The same is
true for setups in which participants control an avatar by mak-
ing real-body movements (Slater et al., 2010). In order to mimic
the situation in lucid dreams, a first step would be to dissociate
bodily imagery from real-body movement. Indeed, several stud-
ies have used brain-computer interfaces to enable participants to
control avatars or robots via bodily imagery (i.e., merely imagined
movement; cf. Pfurtscheller et al., 2006; Friedman et al., 2007a,b),
thus approximating the type of thought control involved in lucid
dreams. Here, the general finding, once more in keeping with
newer accounts of self-other distinctions in a predictive process-
ing framework (cf. Apps and Tsakiris, 2014), is that even these
more abstract, imagistic forms of control lead participants to
identify with the avatar. In order to mimic lucid control dreams,
then, something more would be needed. In particular, VR would
have to create a situation in which participants, perhaps thanks
to sensorimotor coherence and bodily agency, first identified with
one avatar, and then were given the ability to additionally control,
perhaps via bodily imagery within the dream, the movements of
another, such that the non-self avatar were now acting toward the
self, e.g., by tickling its foot. We would now, as in a lucid dream,
have two different avatars, driven by different kinds of control
(e.g., bodily imagery vs. real-body movement and sensorimotor
contingency), only one of which would be the target of owner-
ship and identification. One could then investigate in more detail
and in a more carefully controlled manner whether this would
result, as in our study, in sensory attenuation for being tickled
by the non-self avatar—and one could thereby make progress
on isolating and experimentally manipulating the relevant fac-
tors underlying agency, ownership and the self-other distinction,
as well as participants’ prior expectations, both conscious and
unconscious. A careful prediction would be that once participants
had been induced to identify with one avatar, the unit of identifi-
cation should remain stable even as they gain the ability to control
another, which would continue to be experienced as distinct from
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the self. In particular, they should not, we submit, simultaneously
identify with more than one avatar at the same time.
Even beyond the delicate matter of self-tickling, this type of
experiment might have profound theoretical implications. In par-
ticular, it might help sharpen, both conceptually and experimen-
tally, the distinction between different types of agency, ranging
from agency for bodily movement under conditions of appro-
priate sensorimotor coherence, to bodily imagery in the absence
of real-body enactment and sensorimotor coherence, to, perhaps,
more abstract and conceptual forms of control, such as simply
willing the avatar to tickle one’s foot. It might also shed light
on the degree of precision of temporal and motor predictions
required for bringing about sensory attenuation for the actions
of a non-self character (e.g., in a dream or an avatar in a vir-
tual environment) that is under participants’ indirect control (for
an excellent review of factors underlying sensory attenuation, see
Hughes et al., 2013). And finally, it might help identify (and
tamper with) general, longer-term as well as context-specific,
shorter-term expectations about the ability to control others in
natural and virtual environments. At the same time, this type
of experimental setup, though inspired by our findings in lucid
dreams, might circumvent some of themethodological difficulties
encountered by our study.
SENSORY ATTENUATION REVERSED: TOWARD A NEW THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVE
More generally, if our results are taken at face value, they sug-
gest a new perspective on the investigation of sensory attenuation.
Much existing research has tried to create conditions in which the
attenuation of self-generated actions is obliterated, raising them
to the level of other-generated actions and events. We submit
that this research strategy could be complemented by attempts
to isolate the conditions under which other-generated actions
are dampened to the level of self-generated ones—but apparently
without thereby being experienced as one’s own.
Studies investigating agency and self-other distinction during
joint action (cf. Sebanz et al., 2006) indicate that sensory attenua-
tion is indeedmodulated by social interactions. Weiss et al. (2011)
presented the first-ever evidence that sensory attenuation is not
exclusively determined intra-individually, but also modulated by
social interactions. Intriguingly, they found that sounds gener-
ated in an interactive context in which another person was acting
on the participant’s request were significantly attenuated, suggest-
ing that “the other person may become an integral part of one’s
own internal sensorimotor loop that then specifies the relation
between one’s own transmitting action, the other’s responsive
action and sensory consequence” (Weiss et al., 2011, p. e22723).
They also found that attenuation was strongest for self-produced
sounds generated, interestingly, on request of another, possibly
“due to a kind of contrastive enhancement of self-agency in the
interactive action context” (Weiss et al., 2011, p. e22723). Yet, this
is not to say that the difference between self- and other-generated
actions is wholly obliterated in social interaction. Recently, it has
been suggested that even in joint actions, such as in ensemble
music performance, sensory attenuation helps distinguish one’s
own contributions to a shared goal from that of others (Loehr,
2013).
One way of explaining the results of our explorative study,
consequently, might be to say that lucid dream control over the
actions of non-self dream characters leads to sensory attenuation
for other-administered tickles because this involves an incomplete
simulation of joint action, where the non-self character is incom-
pletely distinguished from the self. If this is correct, an intriguing
possibility is that one way of investigating sensory attenuation
during joint action may be to investigate cases in which no social
interaction is actually taking place, but where social interactions
are either simulated internally, as in lucid dreams, or technologi-
cally, as in the hypothetical VR experiment sketched above.
CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, can you tickle yourself in a dream? At least for the
special case of lucid control dreams, the answer seems to be no.
And neither, apparently, can anyone else. Given the limitations
of our explorative study, this result might be somewhat too weak
to constitute a genuine test of whether one is now dreaming or
awake, and thus to provide a palpable alternative to the better-
known pinching test. Even though the tickle-test will likely not
convince the determined skeptic, we still think, however, that the
main value of this result is to suggest a new theoretical perspec-
tive on the problem of sensory attenuation for self- and other-
generated actions, as well as new questions for future research.
In investigating the factors contributing to sensory attenuation,
future studies might focus not just on self-generated actions and
events, but might also investigate the conditions under which sen-
sory attenuation spreads to the sensory consequences of actions
generated by others than the self. It might also focus on cases of
simulated as opposed to actual social interaction and investigate
inmore detail how sensory attenuation and self-other distinctions
change when they are simulated largely offline, as in dreams.
Finally, note that this also leads to an interesting metatheo-
retical observation. This is that aside from their specific results,
lucid dream studies, even of the wholly exploratory nature pre-
sented here, may be theoretically valuable even when, as in our
case, they are too speculative to warrant any strong conclusions in
their own right. In particular, one reason for being interested in
lucid dreams, if we are correct, is that the theoretical discussion of
lucid dreaming is a kind of playground for dreaming up new and
theoretically interesting experimental setups and suggesting new
perspectives for future research, for instance on virtual reality,
full-body illusions, sensory attenuation and the self-other distinc-
tion. If this is all we have achieved with this paper, we think it will
have been well worth its while.
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